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Abstract 
While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there 
is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This 
paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel 
data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960-1999. Estimates show that greater political 
instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-
polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing 
and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this 
study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to 
reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the main determinants of cross-country and 
cross-time differences in seigniorage – real revenues a government acquires by using newly 
issued money to buy goods and non-money assets.1 This is a challenge not yet satisfactorily 
confronted by the economics profession for four reasons. First, several political and 
institutional variables used as explanatory variables in earlier studies were relatively poorer 
measures of political instability and of the institutional environment than those available in 
new datasets such as the Cross National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS), Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI), the Polity IV Database, State Failure Task Force (SFTF) database, 
and the Freedom House ratings. Second, our analysis is based on a richer and wider dataset, 
covering more countries and years than those used in previous studies, and includes a larger 
variety of alternative model specifications. Third, although Aisen and Veiga (2006) study the 
determinants of inflation using a similar dataset, one should not expect that variables affecting 
inflation should affect seigniorage in the exact same way, since the latter might be consistent 
with two different levels of the former in the presence of a well-defined Laffer curve. 
According to Easterly et al. (1995), studying inflation is different to studying seigniorage, 
especially for developing and high inflation countries. Accordingly, the correlation between 
inflation and seigniorage in our sample fluctuates significantly depending on the rate of 
inflation (see Table 1). While it is positive most of the time and for most of the countries, it 
declines with the level of inflation and becomes negative for inflation rates above 400 percent 
per year. Thus, it is misleading to assume that the determinants of inflation are necessary the 
same as those of seigniorage, which means that separate studies of these variables should be 
made. As an example, changes in inflation may result from supply-side shocks, such as 
                                                 
1 Some studies, such as Buiter (2007), distinguish seigniorage (change in monetary base) from central bank 
revenue (interest earned by investing the resources obtained through the past issuance of base money). This 
distinction is useful to study central bank operations and monetary policy effectiveness. For the purposes of this 
paper, however, it suffices to broadly define seigniorage as revenues obtained by a consolidated government 
(treasury and central bank) from the issuance of base money. 
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fluctuations in oil prices, which do not directly affect seigniorage. Conversely, the structure of 
the economy, which affects the capacity to raise taxes and the reliance on seigniorage 
revenues, may not affect inflation in the same way. Fourth, our models are able to identify the 
circumstances under which the relationship between political instability and seigniorage is 
stronger, a central topic of our research and virtually absent from previous empirical studies 
on the determinants of seigniorage. While seigniorage seems to be a less attractive method of 
government financing for several countries, the truth is that it was still used to a greater extent 
in the 1990s than in the 1960s. Furthermore, seigniorage revenues are on average five times 
higher in developing countries than in industrial countries for the period 1960-1999. In the 
1990s, average seigniorage revenues represented 14.65% of total government revenues for 
developing countries, compared to only 1.64% for industrial countries. Therefore, analyzing 
the determinants of seigniorage is an important endeavor, primarily for developing countries. 
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
 Relying upon the theoretical literature and using a dataset covering around 100 
countries for the period 1960-1999, we estimate panel data models to investigate the main 
economic, political and institutional determinants of seigniorage. After controlling for the 
countries’ economic structure and for several other variables that may affect seigniorage, we 
find that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage levels, confirming previous 
results by Cukierman et al. (1992) and Click (1998). 
This paper’s major contribution to the literature is the identification of the 
circumstances under which the above-referred relationship is stronger. That is, we find that 
political instability has stronger effects on seigniorage levels in higher inflation than in 
moderate and low inflation countries, and also in developing than in industrial nations. In 
addition, this relationship is also stronger in countries with (i) higher social polarization; (ii) a 
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tradition of high political instability;2 (iii) higher central bank president turnover (lower de 
facto central bank independence); (iv) lower indexes of economic freedom; (v) more 
authoritarian regimes; (vi) higher domestic debt levels as a percentage of GDP; (vii) lower 
access to international financing (expressed in poorer creditworthiness ratings); and, (viii) 
lower openness to international trade. It is also worth mentioning that, besides its effects on 
the relationship between political instability and seigniorage, social polarization is by itself a 
major determinant of seigniorage. Empirical results show quite clearly that higher degrees of 
social polarization (lower ethnic homogeneity) are associated with higher levels of 
seigniorage. 
 The paper is structured as follows. A survey of the empirical and theoretical literature 
on the relationship between seigniorage, political instability and institutions is presented in 
section 2. The dataset and the empirical models are described in section 3. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The political economy of seigniorage 
Most economists acknowledge that differences on the way countries conduct their 
fiscal policies are behind the variability of the seigniorage levels they sustain.3 But this 
explanation leads to a much deeper and fundamental question, which is why countries differ 
on the way they conduct fiscal policies (see Woo, 2003 and 2005). In particular, governments 
that are able to finance their expenditures through taxes or debt do not need to rely on 
seigniorage revenues. Several studies have explored the idea that structural features of a 
particular economy help determine its “taxable capacity”. Chelliah et al. (1975), for example, 
provide evidence that countries with larger per capita non–export income, more open to trade 
                                                 
2Expressed in a high number of state failure events in the last 15 years, such as revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, 
regime crises, and genocides/politicides. 
3 See Catão and Torrones (2005) for an empirical analysis on the relationship between fiscal deficits and 
inflation and Fischer et al. (2002) for a survey on modern hyper- and high inflations that includes results 
showing a positive relationship between fiscal deficits and seigniorage. 
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and with larger mining but smaller agricultural sectors have, on average, a higher “taxable 
capacity” or ease of collection. This result leads to the conclusion that the countries’ ability to 
tax is technologically constrained by their stage of development and by the structure of their 
economies (e.g. size of the agricultural sector in GDP), and as tax collecting costs are high 
and tax evasion pervasive, countries might use seigniorage more frequently. But what if 
governments, independently of their countries’ economic structures, find it optimal to finance 
expenditures using seigniorage rather than levying other taxes (e.g. taxes on output)? The 
Theory of Optimal Taxation (see Phelps, 1973; Végh, 1989; and Aizenman, 1992) 
rationalizes government behavior in many countries showing that it might be optimal for 
governments to rely on seigniorage if other taxes are highly distortionary. According to this 
theory, governments optimally equate the marginal cost of the inflation tax with that of output 
taxes, therefore minimizing the distortions to the economy when choosing the optimal 
combination of taxes to finance their expenditures. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and 
Cukierman et al. (1992) fail to find evidence that this theory applies to developing countries. 
Click (1998) estimates a model using 90 countries, from 1971-90, and find that only 40 
percent of the cross-country variation in seigniorage can be explained with the Theory of 
Optimal Taxation. The empirical failure of this theory to fully explain the cross-country 
differences in the use of seigniorage revenues motivated the use of theoretical and empirical 
models focusing on the role played by political and institutional variables.  
Cukierman et al. (1992) develop a theoretical model whereby political instability and 
ideological polarization determine the equilibrium efficiency of the tax system and the 
resulting combination of tax revenues and seigniorage that governments use. Using a probit 
model to determine the likelihood of an incumbent government to remain in power, they show 
evidence that higher political instability and ideological polarization lead to higher 
seigniorage. In the empirical analysis of section 4, we employ alternative and more direct 
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measures of political instability, such as variables that count the exact number of cabinet 
changes, executive changes or government crises taking place in a particular year. Moreover, 
whereas they use a dummy variable for democratic regimes as a proxy for ideological 
polarization, we use the Polity Scale (ranged between -10 and +10) to measure the degree of 
democracy in different countries, and an ethnic homogeneity index as a proxy for the degree 
of social polarization. 4  
In line with Cukierman et al. (1992), we conjecture that economies with weaker 
institutions might be unable to build efficient tax systems leading them to use more frequently 
seigniorage as a source of revenue. In the next sections, in addition to the effects of political 
instability on seigniorage, we also estimate the effects of institutions such as democracy and 
economic freedom. Besides structural variables accounting for the taxing capacity of the 
economy and political and institutional variables affecting the use of seigniorage financing of 
fiscal deficits, we also consider, in line with Click (1998), variables that measure the ability of 
governments to finance transitory expenditures with domestic or external debt. To the extent 
that a government is able to finance its expenditure through debt, there is less need to rely on 
seigniorage.  
Our main contribution to the literature is that our models not only identify the main 
political and economic determinants of seigniorage, but also reveal under which 
circumstances the effects of political instability on seigniorage are stronger. Our results 
indicate that the causal effect of political instability on seigniorage is stronger in developing 
and high inflation countries. In addition, it is also stronger in socially-polarized5, less 
                                                 
4 An additional shortcoming of the analysis in Cukierman et al. (1992) is the use of a cross-sectional dataset 
using averages from 1971 to 1982 for only 79 countries, while we use a panel dataset covering around 100 
countries for the period 1960-99.  
5 See Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg (1996), Bhattacharya, et al. (2005) and Albanesi (2007) for studies presenting 
evidence suggesting that inflation and income inequality are positively related. In Desai, et al. (2005) that 
relationship is conditional on the political structure. Woo (2005) finds that social polarization is associated with 
fiscal instability while generating incentives to engage in short-term policies leading to lower growth. Our 
findings indicate that the fiscal instability channel may also lead to higher seigniorage and inflation. 
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democratic, traditionally unstable, and highly indebted countries. Finally, political instability 
has greater effects on seigniorage in countries that have lower de facto central bank 
independence, lower economic freedom, lower creditworthiness ratings and lower openness to 
international trade. In our view, and to the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive 
study in the literature fully analyzing the relationship between political instability and 
seigniorage. As it will become clear in the following sections, this paper is an attempt to 
contribute in this direction. 
 
3. Data and the empirical model 
 The dataset is composed of annual data on political, institutional and economic 
variables for the years 1960 to 1999. Although we collected data for 178 countries, missing 
values for several variables reduce the number of countries in our estimations to around 100. 
The sources of political and institutional data are: the Cross National Time Series Data 
Archive (CNTS); the Polity IV dataset;6 Gwartney and Lawson (2002);7 the Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI 3.0);8 the State Failure Task Force dataset (SFTF);9 and the 
Freedom House ratings.10 Economic data was collected from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Network Growth Database 
(GDN),11 the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the Penn 
World Tables (PWT 6.1),12 Euromoney creditworthiness ratings,13 Cukierman, Webb, and 
Neyapti (1992),14 Dollar and Kraay (2002),15 and Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).16 
                                                 
6 Available on the Internet (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm). 
7 Available on the Internet (http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html).  
8 On this database, see Beck et al. (2001). Available on the Internet though Philip Keefer’s page in the World 
Bank’s site (http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefer.htm). 
9 Available on the Internet (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/sfdata.htm). 
10 Available on the Internet (http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/). 
11 Available on the Internet (http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm). 
12 Available on the Internet (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php). 
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To investigate the main political, institutional and economic determinants of 
seigniorage levels across countries and time, we estimate panel data models, controlling for 
countries’ fixed effects. Seigniorage is defined in two alternative ways: (1) the change in 
reserve money (line 14a of IFS-IMF) as a percentage of nominal GDP (line 99b in IFS-IMF); 
(2) the change in reserve money (line 14a of IFS-IMF) as a percentage of government 
revenues (line 81 in IFS-IMF). Appendix A shows the number of observations, means and 
standard deviations of these seigniorage measures for all countries for which data is 
available.17  
We hypothesize that seigniorage levels depend on the following explanatory variables: 
• A set of variables representing political instability, polarization and institutions: 
o Cabinet Changes (CNTS), a proxy for political instability, counts the number of 
times in a year in which a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts 
are occupied by new ministers. A positive coefficient is expected, as greater 
instability should lead to greater reliance on seigniorage revenues. 
Why may the number of cabinet changes be a good indicator of political 
instability? First, in a country characterized by frequent changes in the composition 
of government, there are also frequent changes in macroeconomic policies, as new 
prime ministers or ministers of finance/economics do not necessarily share the 
views of their predecessors. Second, frequent cabinet changes shorten the horizon of 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 The data on the Euromoney creditworthiness index, raging from 0 to 100, from 1982 to 1999, was kindly 
provided by Reid Click. 
14 Underlying data available on the Internet (http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/WebbPoltime2.xls). 
15 Underlying data available on the Internet (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/648083-1108140788422/Growth_is_good_for_the_poor_data.zip) 
16 Underlying data available on the Internet (http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen/base_2002.xls). 
17 There is data on ΔRM/GDP for 144 countries and on ΔRM/GR for 122 countries. These are the seigniorage 
measures most commonly used in the literature. We performed all estimations for both measures but, to make 
our results more easily comparable to those of Cukierman et al. (1992), we report in most tables those obtained 
when using the change in reserve money as a percentage of government revenues. Two additional ways of 
measuring seigniorage, used by Cukierman et al. (1992), are the product of reserve money by the inflation rate 
divided by either GDP or government revenues. These authors have shown that these two additional alternative 
measures of seigniorage provide similar results for a cross-section of countries. Another alternative, used by 
Click (1998), is the change in the monetary base as a percentage of government spending.  
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the members of government, as they are not certain that they will keep their posts 
during an entire term. The higher the probability of being replaced, the greater will 
be the importance attributed to short-term objectives. Then, since the costs of future 
inflation are not fully internalized, it is difficult to resist the temptation to finance 
current expenditures with seigniorage revenues. 
o Ethnic Homogeneity Index (SFTF): ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating ethnic homogeneity, and equals the sum of the squared population 
fractions of the seven largest ethnic groups in a country. For each year, it takes the 
value of the index in the beginning of the respective decade. According to Woo 
(2003, 2005) higher social polarization, which can be proxied by ethnic 
heterogeneity, leads to higher polarization of preferences for different types of 
government spending and to public deficits. Thus, a negative coefficient is 
expected; 
o Polity Scale (Polity IV): from strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly democratic (10). 
Although the economic theory is not conclusive, we anticipate that democracy is 
associated with lower reliance on seigniorage (negative coefficient);18 
• A set of economic structural variables that reflect characteristics of the countries that may 
affect their capacity to control inflation: 
o Agriculture (% GDP): share of the value added of agriculture in GDP (WDI, WB). 
According to Chelliah, et. al (1975), a positive coefficient is expected. An 
alternative proxy for the structure of the economy is Urban Population (% of total), 
the urbanization ratio (WDI, WB), which according to Edwards and Tabellinni 
(1991) should have a negative sign; 
                                                 
18 Although ethnic homogeneity and the polity scale may also be related with political instability, we see them 
more as institutional variables than as indicators of political instability. 
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o Trade (% GDP): openness to trade (WDI, WB). Since it is associated with larger 
revenues of import duties, we expect that countries more open to trade rely less on 
seigniorage revenues (a negative coefficient is expected);19 
o Real GDP per capita (PWT 6.1). Richer countries have more efficient tax systems 
and, thus, have a lesser need for seigniorage (negative coefficient expected); 
• Variables accounting for economic performance and external shocks: 
o % Change in Terms of Trade (WDI, WB). Favorable evolution of terms of trade 
provides greater tax revenues (negative coefficient expected); 
o Growth of real GDP (WDI, WB). Higher growth rates are associated with 
increasing tax revenues, reducing the need for seigniorage (negative coefficient); 
• Variables accounting for fixed effects of countries and time: 
o Country dummy variables; 
o Dummy variables for each decade: 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
Appendix B presents the descriptive statistics for the above-described dependent and 
independent variables and for additional/alternative explanatory variables that appear in the 
tables shown in the paper. 
The empirical model for seigniorage levels can be summarized as follows: 
  (1) iitiitititittiit TtNiPSSPPIS ,...,1    ,...,1  ,    
''
1, ==++++++= − ενδβα γEcPφEco
Where S is seigniorage, PI is a proxy for political instability, SP is a proxy for social 
polarization, PS is the Polity Scale, Eco is a vector of economic structural variables, EcP is a 
vector of variables accounting for economic performance and external shocks, νi is the fixed 
effect of country i, and εit is the error term.  
                                                 
19 The outcome on seigniorage may be similar, even if more open countries are imposing lower tariffs. These 
countries may rely less on seigniorage in order to avoid the real appreciation of the home currency associated 
with higher inflation. We owe this rationale to an anonymous referee. 
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 It is worth noting that seigniorage is not persistent (its first lag is never statistically 
significant when included as an explanatory variable) and that the error term of equation (1), 
εit, is not serially correlated. Fisher type unit root tests for panel data reject the null hypothesis 
that seigniorage is non-stationary in all countries.20 Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests performed on each individual country reject unit root behavior of seigniorage for 
all countries that have at least ten observations (in 15 countries, a drift term has to be 
included). These results, which are available upon request, are consistent with those of Click 
(2000), who rejected a unit root behavior of seigniorage in the four countries considered in his 
study (USA, UK, Brazil, and Argentina). 
The proxy for political instability (PIi,t-1) is lagged one period for two reasons. First, 
political instability may translate into higher seigniorage only after some time. Furthermore, if 
a cabinet change occurs in the end of one year, it is very likely to lead to higher seigniorage 
only in the following year. Second, since from Aisen and Veiga (2006) higher seigniorage 
leads to higher inflation, which may affect political instability, using the contemporaneous 
value of political instability could create simultaneity/endogeneity problems. Taking the first 
lag avoids these problems, as current seigniorage does not affect past political instability. 
Since current seigniorage can affect current economic growth, Growth of GDP is also lagged 
one period. 21 
 
4. Empirical Results 
                                                 
20  The results of three of those tests are presented below: 
Fisher Test (0 lags, no drift). Ho: unit root 
  chi2(244) = 1964.3487  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Fisher Test (1 lag, no drift). Ho: unit root 
  chi2(240) = 1360.5939  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Fisher Test (0 lags, with a drift term). Ho: unit root 
  chi2(240) = 2095.2873  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
21 The contemporaneous values are used for the remaining explanatory variables, since they are taken as 
exogenous.  
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 The first objective of our empirical analysis is to identify the main political, 
institutional and economic determinants of seigniorage levels across countries and time. Then, 
after finding strong support for our hypothesis that greater political instability leads to higher 
seigniorage, we try to determine under which circumstances or country characteristics this 
relationship is stronger. Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis that checks whether or not 
the main results hold for alternative proxies of political instability, for an alternative definition 
of seigniorage, for a sample that only includes developing countries, when our main proxy for 
political instability (Cabinet Changes) is defined in a different way, for a cross section and for 
samples of 5-year and 10-year periods, when outliers are controlled for, and when 
instrumental variables are used to account for the possibility that some explanatory variables 
are endogenous.  
 
a) Main determinants of seigniorage levels 
The estimation results of the model described in the previous section, using a fixed 
effects specification,22 are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable is the change in reserve 
money as a percentage of government revenues, and all explanatory variables described in the 
previous section were included in the estimation reported in column 1. Results confirm the 
hypothesis that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage levels, and show that 
the effects are sizeable: an additional cabinet change increases seigniorage as a percentage of 
government revenues by 4.15 percentage points. Higher values of the Ethnic Homogeneity 
Index (lower social polarization) are associated with lower use of seigniorage, which is 
consistent with the findings of Cukierman et al. (1992) 23 and Woo (2003), and with the 
                                                 
22 Hausmann tests indicate that the fixed effects specification is preferable to a random effects model, and the 
joint statistical significance of the country dummies implies that a fixed effects model is preferable to a simple 
pooled OLS model. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
23 Although Cukierman et al. (1992) refer to ideological polarization, the crucial factor in their model is the 
polarization of preferences for different types of government spending, which can also result from social 
polarization. Furthermore, higher social polarization is generally associated with higher ideological polarization. 
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theoretical model of Woo (2005). Democracy does not seem to affect seigniorage, as the 
Polity Scale is not statistically significant.24 Regarding the economic variables, only 
Agriculture (%GDP), Real GDP per capita, and Growth of Real GDP(-1) are statistically 
significant, with the expected signs. Finally, the coefficients on the decade dummy variables 
are all positive and statistically significant.  
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
Since Trade (%GDP) and %Change in Terms of Trade are not statistically significant 
in the first column, they are excluded from the model of column 2.25 Results remain 
practically the same. Then, in column 3, Agriculture (%GDP) was replaced by an alternative 
proxy for the structure of the economy, Urban Population (% of total), for which there is a 
higher number of observations. The negative coefficient conforms to the idea that greater 
urbanization ratios are associated with greater ease to collect taxes and, thus, with lower 
seigniorage (see Edwards and Tabellini, 1991). The only changes in results are that the Ethnic 
Homogeneity Index becomes highly statistically significant, and the coefficients of the decade 
dummies indicate that seigniorage increased until the 1980s and slightly decreased in the 
1990s. Since this specification of column 3 increases the number of observations by 324 (or 
16.3%) and the number of countries by 7 (or 7%) relative to that of column 2, it will be used 
as our reference model. 
Results regarding political instability26 conform to our expectations and are consistent 
with those found by Aisen and Veiga (2006) for inflation levels, and with those of Cukierman 
et. al (1992) using cross sectional data. Those concerning economic variables are consistent 
with the findings of previous studies, such as Chelliah et. al (1975), Edwards and Tabellini 
                                                 
24 This is not surprising, as Aisen and Veiga (2006) found that democracy marginally affects inflation and the 
effect is very small. 
25 They are never statistically significant when included in the models of the following columns of Table 4 or in 
those of the following Tables. Wald tests allow for the exclusion of these variables from the model. 
26 The results obtained when using three alternative proxies of political instability also available in the Cross 
National Time Series Data Archive - Government Crises, Executive Changes, and the Weighted Conflict Index - 
are very similar. These results are not shown here, but are available from the authors upon request.  
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(1991), and Click (1998), indicating that larger agricultural sectors, lower urbanization ratios, 
lower GDP per capita levels, and slower economic growth are associated with greater reliance 
on seigniorage revenues.27 
The time-dimension of seigniorage is captured by the decade dummies (column 3) and 
by a quadratic trend (column 4). These indicate that seigniorage increased until the 1980s, and 
declined during the nineties. In fact, the estimated coefficients of Trend and Trend2 indicate 
that seigniorage hit its peak in 1990, and declined afterwards. Although one would expect the 
increased independence of central banks in industrial countries to start reducing seigniorage 
sooner, several developing countries still had high inflation (or even hyperinflation) and 
seigniorage in the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s.28 It is also interesting to note 
that most explanatory variables, with the exception of Cabinet Changes, exhibit relatively low 
time-series variation within each country. In fact, while Cabinet Changes has an average 
coefficient of variation within countries of 1.48, those of the other explanatory variables are 
all below 0.25 (the lowest is 0.065 for the Ethnic Homogeneity Index, which varies vary little 
over time).  
As mentioned above, the country dummy variables are always jointly statistically 
significant. They account for a considerable part of the adjusted R2 of 0.22 reported in 
columns 3 and 4. Since a pooled OLS, without fixed effects, would only have an adjusted R2 
of 0.07, roughly 0.15 of the variation in seigniorage is not explained by independent variables 
listed. This also means that more work needs to be done in this topic in order to improve the 
explanatory power of our models. 
The results of robustness tests based on the model of column 3 are shown in Table 3. 
Those reported in column 1 indicate that higher economic freedom is associated with lower 
                                                 
27 The first three variables were not statistically significant in Aisen and Veiga (2006). That is, those structural 
variables help explain seigniorage but not inflation, supporting our assertion in the introduction that their 
determinants are not the same and that separate studies for inflation and seigniorage should be implemented. 
28 For example, Argentina had hyperinflation in 1989, Brazil in 1990 and 1994, Peru in 1990, etc. 
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reliance on seigniorage. A higher Index of Economic Freedom29 is associated with smaller 
governments, stronger legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, 
greater freedom to exchange with foreigners, and more flexible regulations of credit, labor, 
and business. Since these are characteristics of more advanced economies with lesser need of 
seigniorage financing, the negative coefficient found conforms to our expectations. 
Revolutionary wars in the country and civil/ethnic conflicts in Border States (columns 2 and 
3, respectively) lead to higher reliance on seigniorage. This result is intuitive, since these 
occurrences are associated with larger military spending, which may be at least partially 
seigniorage-financed. The model of column 4 indicates that fixed exchange rates30 lead to 
lower seigniorage levels. A possible explanation is that fixed exchange rates constrain 
monetary policy to the defense of the fixed parity and, thus, make the collection of 
seigniorage revenues harder. The results of column 5 confirm Click’s (1998) result that 
seigniorage will be higher when the international creditworthiness of the country is lower. 
That is, when external borrowing is less available (or costlier), the government has to rely 
more heavily on seigniorage revenues. Finally, the last two columns test the effects of 
financial depth, which Woo (2003) found to be positively related with fiscal deficits. Two 
proxies taken from the database of financial development and structure of Beck, et al. (2000) 
are used: the ratio of deposit money bank assets to central bank assets, and liquid liabilities as 
a percentage of GDP. Although both have the expected negative sign, indicating that countries 
                                                 
29 Gwartney and Lawson’s (2002) data on the Index of Economic Freedom starts in 1970 and has a 5-year 
frequency. In order to avoid missing values, straight line interpolation was used to generate annual data. Since 
Access to Sound Money is affected by seigniorage, we avoided eventual endogeneity problems by using a 
transformed index that excludes that area (Area III). 
30 The result reported in column 7 is for the 5-way classification system of de facto exchange rate regimes of 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). Results are the same when their 3-way classification system is used 
instead. Since their data starts only in 1974, the inclusion of this variable originates a large number of missing 
values. That is why it was not included in the models of the previous columns. When included, it is always 
statistically significant, with a negative sign. 
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with more developed financial markets are more capable of financing higher deficits without 
resorting to seigniorage, only the first of these variables is statistically significant.31 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 Despite all the tests implemented, which involved regressing seigniorage on a vast 
array of potential determinants, robustness may still be a concern. As the empirical economic 
growth literature has shown (see Durlauf et al, 1995, and Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004) the 
parameter estimates obtained in growth regressions are often sensitive to the inclusion of 
other conditional variables. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there are no studies of the 
robust determinants of seigniorage that can be used to guide the decision of which variables to 
include in our estimations.32 Nevertheless, considering the persistence of our main results 
across a vast array of alternative specifications, it might be safe to argue that they are robust. 
 
b) Circumstances under which the effects of political instability on seigniorage are stronger 
Although our results regarding the relationship between political instability and 
seigniorage are clear, it is possible that they are stronger in some circumstances or in 
countries with specific characteristics. Aisen and Veiga (2006) found that political instability 
affect inflation levels especially in high inflation and developing countries, whereas that 
relationship was practically nonexistent in low inflation and industrialized countries. In order 
                                                 
31 A series of additional robustness tests, whose results are not shown here, were also performed. First, the 
Freedom House ratings of Political Rights and Civil Liberties were used instead of the Polity Scale. None was 
statistically significant. The same result was obtained when using indicators of Executive Constraints (CNTS) 
and of Checks and Balances (DPI). Second, indicators of Ideological Polarization (DPI), Ideological 
Orientation (DPI) and Religious Homogeneity (SFTF) were added to the reference model, but were not 
statistically significant. Third, we also found that trading partners GDP growth (GDN), external debt (WDI), 
domestic debt (IFS), de jure central bank independence (CW), U.S. Treasury Bill rates (IFS), real effective 
exchange rates (WDI), current account balance (IFS), government revenues as a percentage of GDP (IFS), and 
dollarization ratios (share of dollar deposits) do not affect seigniorage in a statistically significant way. All 
results not shown in the paper are available from the authors upon request. Although the indicator of Ideological 
Polarization taken from the DPI was not statistically significant, we should not interpret this result as a rejection 
of the model of Cukierman et al. (1992) in which greater ideological polarization leads to higher seigniorage. 
Since this indicator only takes the values of 0, 1 or 2, it does not satisfactorily represent the wide differences in 
ideological polarization among countries. These may be better proxied by the indicators of social polarization 
used in this paper. 
32 Implementing an analysis such as that of Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) to determine the robust determinants of 
seigniorage is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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to check if the same happens with seigniorage, we performed estimations based in the model 
of column 3 of Table 2 in which Cabinet Changes was interacted with dummy variables 
accounting for annual inflation rates above and below 50% and for developing and industrial 
countries. Results, illustrated in Figure 1,33 are consistent with those of Aisen and Veiga 
(2006). That is, greater political instability, expressed in a higher number of cabinet changes, 
leads to higher seigniorage levels only in high inflation and developing countries. 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
According to Woo (2003, 2005), social polarization, which can be proxied by income 
inequality and ethnic or religious heterogeneity/fractionalization, and the quality of 
institutions are important determinants of budget deficits. In highly polarized societies, the 
high heterogeneity of preferences may translate to political parties and interest groups 
lobbying for different types and amounts of government spending. Then, high polarization of 
interests may lead to higher seigniorage, in the presence of political instability.34 The quality 
of institutions is also very important because more stringent and transparent budgetary 
procedures, independence of the central bank, and greater parliamentary influence in the 
budgetary process can reduce the government’s ability to increase budget deficits and extract 
seigniorage revenues. 
The hypothesis that the relationship between seigniorage and political instability is 
affected by social polarization is tested interacting Cabinet Changes with dummy variables 
for average Gini coefficients above and below 40,35 for high and low ethnic homogeneity,36 
and for high and low religious homogeneity. Results clearly support the hypothesis that 
                                                 
33 The coefficient obtained for Cabinet Changes (Pol.Instability) in Column 3 of Table 2 is shown in the first bar of 
Figure 1. The estimation results for the interactions of Cabinet Changes considered in Figure 1 are reported in 
Appendix C, 
34 In the model of Cukierman et al. (1992), this high polarization of interests results in higher seigniorage. 
35 The dummy Gini>40 takes the value of one for countries whose average Gini coefficient is above 40, and 
equals zero for the remaining countries. (Gini≤ 40) = 1 – (Gini>40). 
36 The dummy Low Ethnic Homogeneity takes the value of one for countries whose respective index is equal to 
or lower than the 25th percentile, and equals zero for the remaining countries. (High Ethnic Homogeneity = 1 – 
Low Ethnic Homogeneity). The same procedure was adopted for the religious homogeneity dummies. 
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political instability has stronger effects on seigniorage in countries with large social 
polarization (high income inequality and low ethnic or religious homogeneity). Finally, we 
test the hypothesis that political instability will have greater effects on seigniorage in 
countries that have traditionally been more unstable. Two dummy variables were created 
using the variable Upheaval from the SFTF, 37 which indicates the sum of the maximum 
magnitude of events in the prior 15 years, including revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, regime 
crises, and genocides/politicides. Although both dummies turned out as  statistically 
significant, the magnitude of the coefficients implies that the number of cabinet changes in the 
previous year (our proxy for political instability) has greater impact on seigniorage in 
traditionally unstable countries.38 
The hypothesis that institutions affect that relationship was tested interacting Cabinet 
Changes with dummy variables for high and low turnover rates of central bank presidents,39 
for high and low economic freedom,40 and for Polity Scale below and above zero. The results, 
illustrated in the second and third bars of Figure 2,41 imply that greater political instability 
leads to higher seigniorage only when there is a high turnover rate of central bank presidents, 
that is, when the de facto independence of the central bank is low. When independence is 
high, seigniorage does not increase, as the government is no longer able to affect reserve 
money.42 Political instability also seems to affect seigniorage only in countries that have a 
                                                 
37 High Upheaval equals one when the value of Upheaval is above 3, and equals zero otherwise. Low Upheaval 
= 1- High Upheaval. 
38 When Cabinet Changes is interacted with regional dummy variables, the positive effect of political instability 
on seigniorage is statistically significant only for Western Hemisphere (Latin American) and African countries. 
These results are not shown here, but are available upon request. 
39 Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) use this turnover rate as an indicator of de facto central bank 
independence. The dummy High Turnover takes the value of one when the turnover rate is above the sample 
median of 0.20, and is zero otherwise. Low turnover = 1 – High Turnover.  
40 The dummy variable High Economic Freedom takes the value of one when the Index of Economic Freedom is 
greater than 5, and equals zero otherwise (Low Economic Freedom = 1- High Economic Freedom). Again, we 
used a transformed index that excludes Area III (Access to Sound Money). 
41 The estimation results for the interactions of Cabinet Changes considered in Figure 2 are reported in Appendix 
D, 
42 It is worth noting that this result does not hold when the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) legal index of 
Central Bank Independence is used instead of the turnover rate of presidents (that proxies de facto 
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low Index of Economic Freedom. This implies that the establishment of sounder and freer 
economic institutions is a way to reduce the impact of political instability on seigniorage. 
More democratic institutions also seem to matter, as the results indicate that political 
instability affects seigniorage less in democratic countries (Polity Scale>0) than in countries 
under authoritarian regimes (Polity Scale≤ 0).  
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Click (1998) shows that when governments face greater constraints to issue domestic 
and/or external debt, they tend to resort more often to seigniorage revenues. We hypothesize 
that the effects of political instability on seigniorage levels also depend on the ratios of 
domestic debt to GDP and on the countries’ creditworthiness. That is, when greater political 
instability leads to higher deficits, governments resort more often to seigniorage revenues to 
finance them when domestic or foreign borrowing is more difficult (or costlier). The results 
provide empirical support for the above-referred hypothesis, as a greater number of Cabinet 
Changes is associated with higher seigniorage only in countries that have High Domestic 
Debt 43 or Low Creditworthiness .44 
Finally, we test the hypothesis that political instability will lead to greater seigniorage 
essentially in countries with lower trade openness ratios. Although we did not identify a direct 
relationship between openness and seigniorage in the estimations of Table 2, it is possible that 
openness to international trade affects the relationship between political instability and 
seigniorage. That is, in more open economies, the increase in government expenditures caused 
by political instability may be partially financed by higher taxes on trade, reducing the need to 
                                                                                                                                                        
independence). This may happen because what really matters for the conduct of monetary policy is the de facto 
independence and not what is written in the central bank law.  
43 High Domestic Debt (H.Dom.Debt) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the countries whose 
average ratio of domestic debt to GDP is above the countries’ median ratio (13.28), and takes the value of zero 
otherwise. Low Domestic Debt = 1 – High Domestic Debt 
44 High Creditworthiness (H.Creditworth.) is a dummy variable that equals one for the countries whose average 
Euromoney’s creditworthiness rating is above 60 (the 75th percentile of the country averages), and equals zero 
otherwise. Low Creditworthiness=1- High Creditworthiness.  
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resort to seigniorage financing. Results shown in the last two bars of Figure 2 are consistent 
with this hypothesis.45 
 
c) Sensitivity analysis 
 Three alternative indexes of political instability were constructed by applying the 
principal components analysis. The variables used to define each Political Instability Index 
were (all from the CNTS):46 
o P.I. Index 1: Assassinations, Cabinet Changes, Constitutional Changes, Coups, 
Executive Changes, Government Crises, and Revolutions; 
o P.I. Index 2: Assassinations, Constitutional Changes, Coups, Government Crises, 
and Revolutions (same as in Woo, 2003); 
o P.I. Index 3: Cabinet Changes, Executive Changes, and Government Crises.  
Table 4 reports the results of estimations using these alternative indexes. They are very 
similar to those obtained for Cabinet Changes, reported in Table 2 and Appendix C. Thus, our 
results are not sensitive to the choice of the proxy for political instability. That is, for all 
variables used, political instability is positively related to seigniorage. 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 Columns 1 to 3 of Table 5 report results obtained for an alternative definition of 
seigniorage: Change in Reserve Money as a percentage of GDP. In the models of columns 4 
and 5 the sample contains only developing countries, and seigniorage is defined as in the 
previous tables. Finally, in the models of columns 6 to 8, a three-year moving average of 
Cabinet Changes was used instead of its annual values, in order to better capture eventual 
                                                 
45 . It is worth noting that the interactions of Cabinet Changes with High Turnover and with High Domestic Debt 
are only statistically significant at the 10% level. 
46 This technique for data reduction describes linear combinations of the variables that contain most of the 
information. It analyses the correlation matrix and the variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard 
deviation of 1 at the outset. Then, for each of the three groups of variables, the first component identified, the 
linear combination with greater explanatory power, was used as the political instability index.  
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persistent situations of political instability. In all cases, results are similar to those obtained in 
Tables 2 and Appendix C, meaning that our conclusions regarding the effects of political, 
institutional and economic variables on seigniorage levels remain practically the same. 
--- Insert Table 5 about here – 
 Results for alternative data frequencies are shown in Table 6. In columns 1, 3 and 5 
the reference model was estimated for a cross section of 108 countries and for panels of 10-
year and 5-year averages. Results are still supportive of the hypothesis that political instability 
leads to greater seigniorage. Although the Ethnic Homogeneity Index is not statistically 
significant in the cross section (column 1), the results for the panel estimations provide 
evidence in favor of the view that social polarization leads to seigniorage. The Index of 
Economic Freedom was added in columns 2, 4 and 6. As happened in Column 1 of Table 3, 
this variable is highly statistically significant, with a negative sign, reinforcing the conclusion 
that greater economic freedom is associated with lower reliance on seigniorage revenues. 
--- Insert Table 6 about here – 
 It is possible that outliers associated with high inflation and high seigniorage episodes 
affect the results of our regressions. This possibility is accounted for, using annual data, in 
columns 1 to 4 of Table 7. In column 1, all observations for which annual inflation was above 
1000% were excluded. Then, in column 2, we only included the observations for which 
seigniorage (as a percentage of government revenues) was smaller or equal to its mean plus 
two standard deviations (≤ 156.76%). Results in both cases are very similar to those of the 
reference model. Then, we used two robust estimation procedures: least median of squares 
(LMS), in column 3; and, least absolute deviation (LAD), in column 4. In both cases, a 
greater number of cabinet changes is associated with higher seigniorage, but the Ethnic 
Homogeneity Index is not statistically significant when using LAD (column 4). 
--- Insert Table 7 about here – 
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 Finally, we estimated instrumental variables (IV) models in order to account for the 
possibility that some explanatory variables are endogenous. Dealing with inflation, Aisen and 
Veiga (2006), used the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-SYS) estimator for 
dynamic panel data models. But, since lagged seigniorage is never statistically significant 
when included in our estimations, we do not have a dynamic panel. Thus, in columns 5 and 6, 
we performed two-step feasible GMM and LIML (Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood), respectively, with instrumental variables.47 Results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that political instability and social polarization lead to greater reliance on 
seigniorage revenues.48 
 
5. Conclusions 
 The main purpose of this paper was to identify the major determinants of the cross-
country and cross-time variability of seigniorage. Using a dataset covering about 100 
countries, from 1960-1999, and applying standard panel data techniques, we found that 
greater political instability and social polarization lead to higher seigniorage. These results are 
consistent with the findings of previous studies such as Cukierman et al. (1992), Click (1998) 
and Woo (2003, 2005). 
 Our major contribution to the literature is that, in addition to the above-referred 
results, we succeeded to comprehensively determine the circumstances under which political 
instability has a greater impact on seigniorage, an important topic that received little attention 
in previous studies. Our results indicate that the effects of political instability on seigniorage 
are stronger in high-inflation, developing, socially polarized, and traditionally more unstable 
                                                 
47 These estimations were performed using the ivreg2 command of Stata. Lagged values one and two periods of 
Cabinet Changes were used as instruments for that variable. Using geographical dummies and other variables as 
additional instruments does not significantly change the results. Orthogonality tests do not reject the exogeneity 
of the other explanatory variables. The option cluster was used in order to account for intra-country correlation. 
48 One should note that the estimated coefficients for Cabinet Changes get very large. This may be due to weak 
instruments. In fact, when good instruments are not available, it may be preferable not to perform instrumental 
variables estimations.  
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economies. Moreover, the same applies to countries with high turnover rates of central bank 
presidents (lower de facto central bank independence), with lower levels of economic 
freedom, that are less democratic, with higher domestic debt, with poorer creditworthiness 
ratings and with lower openness to international trade. 
 Although the results concerning political instability and institutional variables are 
similar to those of Aisen and Veiga’s (2006) study of inflation, there are several differences 
regarding other explanatory variables, which support our assertion that the determinants of 
inflation and seigniorage are not exactly the same and that it is necessary to conduct separate 
studies for these variables. In fact, seigniorage does not seem to be affected by changes in oil 
prices or US Treasury Bill rates (which affect inflation), but is determined by structural 
variables that condition the government’s ability to raise taxes, such as the size of the 
agricultural sector, the urbanization ratio, and the level of GDP per capita, which do not seem 
to affect inflation. 
 The results of this study have policy implications that greatly contribute to the policy 
debate in high inflation (seigniorage) and politically unstable economies. Our results show 
that countries adopting policies targeting greater political stability, lower income inequality, 
and institutional strengthening, such as new laws governing central bank independence, limit 
the negative effect of political instability on seigniorage, improving their chances of 
successfully lowering their dependence on seigniorage revenues to finance their governments’ 
deficits. After some time, they should benefit from lower inflation and, consequently, higher 
growth and economic prosperity. 
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Table 1: Correlation between Inflation and Seigniorage 
 
Sample Observations Correlation 
All 3171 0.214 
Inflation < 10% 1967 0.102 
Inflation <100% 3083 0.305 
Inflation >100% 88 0.132 
Inflation >200% 43 0.058 
Inflation >300% 34 0.0001 
Inflation >400% 28 -0.007 
Inflation >500% 26 -0.038 
Inflation >1000% 18 -0.139 
Notes:  
- Inflation is the annual inflation rate (IFS line 64x) 
- Seigniorage is the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a 
percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81). 
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Table 2: Results for Seigniorage 
 
Seigniorage 1 2 3 4 
Cabinet Changes (-1) 4.149 
(2.52)** 
3.688 
(2.45)*** 
4.282 
(3.01)*** 
4.309 
(2.99)*** 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index -22.776 
(-1.78)* 
-22.419 
(-1.86)* 
-24.054 
(-2.65)*** 
-24.747 
(-2.78)*** 
Polity Scale .380 
(1.44) 
.379 
(1.55) 
.300 
(1.45) 
.306 
(1.50) 
Agriculture (% GDP) 1.748 
(3.62)*** 
1.594 
(3.57)*** 
  
Urban population (% of total)   -.486 
(-2.39)** 
-.565 
(-2.58)*** 
Trade (%GDP) .013 
(.20) 
   
Real GDP per capita -.001 
(-3.77)*** 
-.001 
(-4.23)*** 
-.002 
(-5.32)*** 
-.002 
(-5.11)*** 
% Change in Terms of Trade .89e-07 
(1.32) 
   
Growth of Real GDP (-1) -.467 
(-2.97)*** 
-.432 
(-3.05)*** 
-.664 
(-3.85)*** 
-.655 
(-3.87)*** 
Dummy1970s 10.247 
(3.88)*** 
8.779 
(4.09)*** 
7.088 
(3.83)*** 
 
Dummy1980s 18.575 
(3.97)*** 
16.998 
(4.17)*** 
13.448 
(3.85)*** 
 
Dummy1990s 19.476 
(3.34)*** 
17.651 
(3.56)*** 
12.367 
(2.80)*** 
 
Trend    1.622 
(4.67)*** 
Trend2    -.026 
(-4.06)*** 
# Observations 1836 1982 2306 2306 
# Countries 97 101 108 108 
Adjusted R2 .25 .25 .22 .22 
Adjusted R2 (without fixed effects)   .07 .07 
Notes: - Panel regressions with fixed effects of countries and a constant. T-statistics based 
on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis.  
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%; 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money 
(IFS, line 14a) as a percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81). 
 
Table 3: Additional Determinants of Seigniorage 
Seigniorage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cabinet Changes (-1) 4.638 
(2.62)*** 
4.372 
(3.07)*** 
4.299 
(3.03)*** 
5.686 
(2.59)*** 
5.965 
(2.78)*** 
3.150 
(2.76)*** 
1.253 
(1.51) 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index -56.688 
(-3.22)*** 
-23.074 
(-2.62)*** 
-23.869 
(-2.68)*** 
-86.308 
(-1.89)* 
-74.736 
(-3.29)*** 
-22.404 
(-2.15)** 
-6.727 
(-.63) 
Polity Scale .529 
(1.74)* 
.266 
(1.35) 
.313 
(1.49) 
.550 
(1.32) 
.148 
(.31) 
.121 
(.49) 
.178 
(1.18) 
Urban population (% of total) -.573 
(-2.19)** 
-.430 
(-2.29)** 
-.548 
(-2.46)** 
-1.144 
(-2.52)** 
-.654 
(-1.64) 
-.502 
(-2.21)** 
-.033 
(-.22) 
Real GDP per capita  -.002 
(-5.15)*** 
-.001 
(-5.62)*** 
-.001 
(-1.13) 
.001 
(1.41) 
-.001 
(-1.94)* 
-.001 
(-4.11)*** 
Growth of Real GDP (-1) -.568 
(-2.89)*** 
-.617 
(-3.88)*** 
-.616 
(-3.85)*** 
-.701 
(-3.03)*** 
-.624 
(-2.97)*** 
-.510 
(-3.43)*** 
-.380 
(-2.72)*** 
Index of Economic Freedom -9.381 
(-5.27)*** 
      
Revolutionary war  12.561 
(1.86)* 
     
Civil/ethnic conflicts in border states   5.530 
(1.99)** 
    
Exchange Rate Regime    -2.416 
(-2.91)*** 
   
Creditworthiness     -.309 
(-2.40)** 
  
Deposit Money Bank Assets / Central Bank Assets      -32.155 
(-1.95)* 
 
Liquid Liabilities (% GDP)       -3.325 
(-.41) 
# Observations 1758 2295 2293 1433 1168 2182 1688 
# Countries 93 108 108 101 106 107 94 
Adjusted R2 .24 .22 .22 .20 .34 .25 .25 
Notes: - Panel regressions with country fixed effects. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81); 
- Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space. 
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Table 4: Results for indexes of political instability generated by Principal Components Analysis 
 Political Instability Index 1 Political Instability Index 2 Political Instability Index 3 
Seigniorage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Political Instability Index (-1) 1.642 
(3.04)*** 
  1.105 
(1.67)* 
  2.274 
(3.34)*** 
  
[Political Instability Index* 
(Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1) 
 9.430 
(3.38)*** 
  7.430 
(2.62)*** 
  14.618 
(3.53)*** 
 
[Political Instability Index * 
(Inflation < 50%)] (-1) 
 .056 
(.14) 
  -.470 
(-.86) 
  .438 
(1.23) 
 
[Political Instability Index * 
(Develop. Countries)] (-1) 
  2.117 
(3.05)*** 
  1.211 
(1.63)* 
  3.978 
(3.50)*** 
[Political Instability Index * 
(Industrial Countries)] (-1) 
  -.061 
(-.17) 
  .247 
(.35) 
  -.237 
(-1.24) 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index -29.887 
(-3.21)*** 
-29.735 
(-3.29)*** 
-29.699 
(-3.17)*** 
-30.688 
(-3.30)** 
-30.818 
(-3.38)*** 
-30.614 
(-3.29)*** 
-29.388 
(-3.20)*** 
-27.612 
(-3.13)*** 
-28.425 
(-3.08)*** 
Polity Scale .353 
(1.69)* 
.361 
(1.76)* 
.350 
(1.68)* 
.374 
(1.77)* 
.382 
(1.80)* 
.374 
(1.77)* 
.318 
(1.52) 
.311 
(1.56) 
.286 
(1.38) 
Urban population (% of total) -.483 
(-2.38)** 
-.435 
(-2.19)** 
-.468 
(-2.32)** 
-.519 
(-2.52)** 
-.512 
(-2.47)** 
-.517 
(-2.51)** 
-.466 
(-2.34)** 
-.363 
(-1.97)** 
-.419 
(-2.16)** 
Real GDP per capita -.002 
(-4.96)*** 
-.001 
(-4.86)*** 
-.002 
(-5.02)*** 
-.002 
(-5.01)*** 
-.002 
(-5.01)*** 
-.002 
(-5.04)*** 
-.002 
(-4.90)*** 
-.001 
(-4.61)*** 
-.002 
(-5.01)*** 
Growth of Real GDP (-1) -.627 
(-3.75)*** 
-.467 
(-2.97)*** 
-.606 
(-3.67)*** 
-.658 
(-3.93)*** 
-.570 
(-3.52)*** 
-.656 
(-3.93)*** 
-.636 
(-3.79)*** 
-.437 
(-2.77)*** 
-.582 
(-3.55)*** 
# Observations 2300 2300 2300 2306 2306 2306 2300 2300 2300 
# Countries 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Adjusted R2 .22 .24 .22 .21 .23 .21 .22 .25 .22 
Notes: - Panel regressions controlling for country fixed effects. Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 
14a) as a percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81). Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). 
Their estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
 - Variables used in the Principal Components Analysis to define each Political Instability Index (all variables were taken from the CNTS): 
- P.I. Index 1: Assassinations, Cabinet Changes, Constitutional Changes, Coups, Executive Changes, Government Crises, and Revolutions; 
- P.I. Index 2: Assassinations, Constitutional Changes, Coups, Government Crises, and Revolutions; 
- P.I. Index 3: Cabinet Changes, Executive Changes, and Government Crises. 
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Table 5: Additional Sensitivity Analysis 
 Δ Reserve Money (%GDP) Developing Countries 
Δ RMoney (%GovRev)
3-Year MA of Cabinet Changes 
Δ Reserve Money (%GovRevenues)
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Cabinet Changes (-1) .202 
(2.00)** 
  6.076 
(3.03)*** 
 9.467 
(3.29)*** 
  
[Cabinet changes * (Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1)  2.019 
(3.41)*** 
  52.191 
(2.99)*** 
 51.331 
(2.95)*** 
 
[Cabinet changes * (Inflation < 50%)] (-1)  -.046 
(-.50) 
  7.575 
(2.39)** 
 4.252 
(2.06)** 
 
[Cabinet changes * (Devel. Countries)] (-1)   .276 
(2.11)** 
    15.067 
(3.61)*** 
[Cabinet changes * (Ind. Countries)] (-1)   -.029 
(-.37) 
    -2.817 
(-3.77)*** 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index -3.982 
(-3.64)*** 
-3.621 
(-3.51)*** 
-3.987 
(-3.63)*** 
-25.868 
(-2.56)** 
-25.541 
(-2.39)** 
-26.390 
(-2.81)*** 
-24.714 
(-2.60)*** 
-25.903 
(-2.70)*** 
Polity Scale .032 
(1.77)* 
.037 
(2.17)** 
.032 
(1.75)* 
.450 
(1.88)* 
.507 
(1.92)* 
.308 
(1.50) 
.364 
(1.62) 
.284 
(1.40) 
Urban population (% of total) -0.15 
(-1.11) 
-.015 
(-1.11) 
-.015 
(-1.13) 
-.548 
(-2.10)** 
-.653 
(-2.41)** 
-.486 
(-2.53)** 
-.546 
(-2.60)*** 
-.472 
(-2.51)** 
Real GDP per capita -.0002 
(-5.85)*** 
-.0001 
(-5.48)*** 
-.0002 
(-5.81)*** 
-.002 
(-4.64)*** 
-.001 
(-2.43)** 
-.002 
(-5.09)*** 
-.001 
(-3.75)*** 
-.002 
(-5.10)*** 
Growth of Real GDP (-1) -.043 
(-3.68)*** 
-.037 
(-3.07)*** 
-.043 
(-3.62)*** 
-.713 
(-3.69)*** 
-.532 
(-3.17)*** 
-.655 
(-3.86)*** 
-.450 
(-3.01)*** 
-.629 
(-3.77)*** 
# Observations 3040 2908 3040 1674 1547 2282 2179 2282 
# Countries 122 122 122 89 88 108 107 108 
Adjusted R2 .24 .27 .25 .19 .24 .22 .27 .23 
Notes: - Panel regressions with fixed effects. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis 
is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
- The sample and the definition of seigniorage used (the dependent variable) are indicated in the first row. 
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Table 6: Results for cross-section and period averages  
 Cross Section 10 – year periods 5 – year periods 
Seigniorage 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cabinet Changes (-1) 13.909 
(1.73)* 
13.857 
(1.70)* 
12.059 
(2.14)** 
16.132 
(1.98)** 
8.021 
(2.74)*** 
8.415 
(2.14)** 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index -2.800 
(-.52) 
-4.978 
(-.89) 
-8.937 
(-1.86)* 
-14.330 
(-2.69)*** 
-6.887 
(-2.20)** 
-12.871 
(-3.24)*** 
Polity Scale -.539 
(-2.23)** 
-.423 
(-1.82)* 
-.213 
(-1.23) 
-.243 
(-1.05) 
-.268 
(-2.00)** 
-.266 
(-1.42) 
Urban population (% of total) .246 
(1.94)* 
.171 
(1.43) 
.266 
(3.13)*** 
.127 
(1.47) 
.221 
(3.51)*** 
.094 
(1.36) 
Real GDP per capita -.001 
(-2.84)*** 
 -.001 
(-5.14)*** 
 -.001 
(-5.82)*** 
 
Growth of Real GDP (-1) .142 
(.38) 
.471 
(.90) 
-1.300 
(-1.56) 
-1.567 
(-1.32) 
-1.134 
(-1.94)* 
-1.047 
(-1.46) 
Index of Economic Freedom  -7.198 
(-2.63)** 
 -7.148 
(-4.27)*** 
 -6.656 
(-4.49)*** 
# Observations 108 94 282 219 548 416 
# Countries 108 94 96 87 108 94 
Adjusted R2 .14 .21 .15 .18 .13 .14 
Notes: - Cross section regressions estimated in columns 1 and 2 (including a constant); 
- Panel regressions controlling for country fixed effects in columns 3 to 6. Models estimated with a constant and 
period dummies. Their estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space.  
 - T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a percentage 
of government revenues (IFS line 81); 
- In the cross-section regressions of columns 1 and 2, there are no lagged values of Cabinet Changes and Growth 
of Real GDP available. Thus, their average values for the entire sample period were used. In the other columns, 
the first lag is the average over the previous period. 
 
Table 7: Controlling for Outliers and Instrumental Variables Estimations 
 Inf ≤ 1000 Seig ≤ 
(Mean+2SD) 
LMS LAD IV 
GMM 
IV 
LIML 
Seigniorage 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cabinet changes (-1) 3.436 
(2.97)*** 
1.284 
(2.23)** 
1.903 
(7.04)*** 
1.148 
(2.86)*** 
41.135 
(1.91)* 
39.256 
(1.79)* 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index -25.853 
(-2.76)*** 
-17.043 
(-2.40)** 
-5.340 
(-8.30)*** 
.821 
(.86) 
-12.812 
(-1.86)* 
-11.837 
(-1.66)* 
Polity Scale .037 
(.19) 
.142 
(1.25) 
.378 
(13.9)*** 
-.167 
(-4.13)*** 
-.195 
(-.99) 
-.199 
(-1.02) 
Urban population (% of 
total) 
-.115 
(-.76) 
-.010 
(-.12) 
-.029 
(-3.02)*** 
.081 
(5.49)*** 
.297 
(2.32)** 
.313 
(2.38)** 
Real GDP per capita -.001 
(-4.08)*** 
-.001 
(-7.08)*** 
-.001 
(-15.5)*** 
-.001 
(-11.0)*** 
-.001 
(-2.33)** 
-.001 
(-2.38)** 
Growth of Real GDP (-1) -.293 
(-2.62)*** 
-.323 
(-3.58)*** 
.208 
(6.43)*** 
-.068 
(-1.42) 
-.564 
(-2.48)** 
-.531 
(-2.27)** 
42 42# Observations 2150 2293 2306 2306 2293 2293 
# Countries 107 108 108 108 108 108 
Adjusted R2 .18 .25 .02 .05 .13 .10 
Notes: - In Columns 1 and 2, panel regressions controlling for country fixed effects were performed on the 
observations that complied with the conditions shown in the first row. Least Median of Squares 
estimation (LMS) was performed on the full sample in Column 3, and Least Absolute Deviation 
(LAD) in Column 4. Finally, instrumental variables estimations were performed in columns 5 and 6, 
using 2-step feasible Generalized Method of Moments (IV-GMM) and Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood (LIML), respectively; 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a 
percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81); 
- All models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their 
estimated coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level 
at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- The IV estimations of columns 5 and 6 were implemented using the command ivreg2 of Stata. 
Lagged values one and two periods of Cabinet Changes were used as instruments of that variable. 
Orthogonality tests do not reject the exogeneity of the other explanatory variables. The option cluster 
was used in order to account for intra-country correlation. 
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Figure 1: Interactions of Political Instability 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Po
l.I
ns
ta
bi
lit
y
PI
*(
In
fla
tio
n≥
50
%
)
PI
*(
In
fla
tio
n<
50
%
)
PI
*D
ev
.C
ou
nt
rie
s
PI
*In
d.
C
ou
nt
rie
s
PI
*(
G
in
i>
40
)
P
I*(
G
in
i≤
40
)
PI
*H
.E
th
.H
om
og
.
PI
*L
.E
th
.H
om
og
.
PI
*H
.R
el
.H
om
og
.
PI
*L
.R
el
.H
om
og
.
PI
*H
.U
ph
ea
va
l
PI
*L
.U
ph
ea
va
l
Im
pa
ct
 o
f p
ol
iti
ca
l I
ns
ta
bi
lit
y 
on
 S
ei
gn
io
ra
ge
 
Notes:  
- The grey bars show estimated coefficients of panel regressions: see Column 3 of Table 2 for the 
coefficient of “Pol.Instability” (Cabinet changes), and Table A.3, in the Appendix, for the remaining 
coefficients (each pair, separated by vertical lines, corresponds to a separate estimation). 
- 2-standard error bands are shown on top of the bars. 
- In the horizontal axis, “H.” stands for High, and “L.” stands for Low. 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a 
percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81); 
- The proxy used for political instability was Cabinet Changes (CNTS). 
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Figure 2: More Interactions of Political Instability 
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Notes:  
- The grey bars show estimated coefficients of panel regressions: see Column 3 of Table 2 for the 
coefficient of “Pol.Instability” (Cabinet changes), and Table A.4, in the Appendix, for the remaining 
coefficients (each pair, separated by vertical lines, corresponds to a separate estimation). 
- 2-standard error bands are shown on top of the bars. 
- In the horizontal axis, “H.” stands for High, and “L.” stands for Low. 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a 
percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81); 
- The proxy used for political instability was Cabinet Changes (CNTS). 
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Appendix A: Seigniorage Across Countries 
           Obs   Mean   StDev            Obs   Mean   StDev            Obs   Mean   StDev 
ALGERIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  31   .033   .018 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
   ΔRM/GDP  22   .013   .035 
ARGENTINA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .060   .078 
   ΔRM/GR   18  1.203  1.287 
ARMENIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   5   .026   .026 
AUSTRALIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .004   .007 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .022   .036 
AUSTRIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .005   .002 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .020   .013 
BAHAMAS 
   ΔRM/GDP  23   .004   .004 
   ΔRM/GR   30   .022   .043 
BAHRAIN 
   ΔRM/GDP  24   .008   .022 
   ΔRM/GR   24   .031   .073 
BANGLADESH 
   ΔRM/GDP  25   .009   .008 
BARBADOS 
   ΔRM/GDP  32   .009   .014 
   ΔRM/GR   25   .035   .047 
BELARUS 
   ΔRM/GDP   4   .042   .014 
   ΔRM/GR    4   .134   .047 
BELGIUM 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .005   .005 
   ΔRM/GR   36   .019   .022 
BELIZE 
   ΔRM/GDP  22   .010   .012 
   ΔRM/GR   19   .041   .052 
BENIN 
   ΔRM/GDP  36   .008   .018 
BHUTAN 
   ΔRM/GDP  15   .035   .053 
   ΔRM/GR   13   .184   .294 
BOLIVIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .026   .031 
   ΔRM/GR   35   .481  1.076 
BOTSWANA 
   ΔRM/GDP  22   .005   .011 
   ΔRM/GR   20   .012   .030 
BRAZIL 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .036   .027 
   ΔRM/GR   35   .247   .187 
BULGARIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   7   .068   .036 
   ΔRM/GR    7   .001   .0001 
BURKINA FASO 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .010   .012 
   ΔRM/GR   26   .096   .109 
BURUNDI 
   ΔRM/GDP  34   .007   .010 
CAMEROON 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .005   .008 
   ΔRM/GR   20   .021   .058 
CANADA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .003   .002 
   ΔRM/GR   35   .021   .013 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 
   ΔRM/GDP  37   .011   .018 
CHAD 
   ΔRM/GDP  28   .010   .020 
   ΔRM/GR   17   .089   .232 
CHILE 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .069   .077 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .283   .281 
 
CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  13   .063   .026 
   ΔRM/GR   13   .474   .250 
CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG 
   ΔRM/GDP   8   .007   .005 
COLOMBIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  37   .019   .009 
   ΔRM/GR    5   .059   .094 
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF 
   ΔRM/GDP  29   .056   .141 
   ΔRM/GR   30   .813  1.983 
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .006   .012 
COSTA RICA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .026   .024 
   ΔRM/GR   29   .230   .189 
COTE D IVOIRE 
   ΔRM/GDP  36   .010   .013 
CROATIA 
   ΔRM/GR    5   .057   .043 
CYPRUS 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .023   .026 
   ΔRM/GR   33   .127   .138 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
   ΔRM/GDP   5   .035   .036 
   ΔRM/GR    5   .114   .114 
DENMARK 
   ΔRM/GDP  39    .00   .012 
   ΔRM/GR   36   .015   .029 
DOMINICA 
   ΔRM/GDP  22   .015   .053 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .015   .016 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .111   .127 
ECUADOR 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .018   .010 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .147   .084 
EGYPT 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .039   .031 
   ΔRM/GR   20   .129   .062 
EL SALVADOR 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .013   .018 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
   ΔRM/GDP  12   .001   .059 
ESTONIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   7   .039   .034 
   ΔRM/GR    6   .159   .147 
ETHIOPIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .013   .017 
   ΔRM/GR   33   .112   .124 
FIJI 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .008   .015 
   ΔRM/GR   29   .039   .070 
FINLAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .002   .002 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .008   .011 
FRANCE 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .004   .004 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .017   .021 
GABON 
   ΔRM/GDP  37   .005   .010 
GAMBIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  30   .016   .029 
   ΔRM/GR   26   .083   .176 
GERMANY 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .004   .002 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .019   .011 
GHANA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .024   .020 
   ΔRM/GR   34   .245   .272 
 
GREECE 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .024   .013 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .120   .065 
GRENADA 
   ΔRM/GDP  26   .017   .027 
   ΔRM/GR   12   .087   .114 
GUATEMALA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .010   .011 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .117   .137 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
   ΔRM/GDP  10   .010   .007 
   ΔRM/GR    6   .436   .214 
GUYANA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .050   .095 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .139   .259 
HAITI 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .015   .021 
   ΔRM/GR   32   .231   .359 
HONDURAS 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .011   .012 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .074   .074 
HUNGARY 
   ΔRM/GDP  13   .025   .045 
   ΔRM/GR   13   .052   .088 
ICELAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .019   .016 
   ΔRM/GR   31   .084   .073 
INDIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .014   .006 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .132   .049 
INDONESIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  33   .016   .010 
   ΔRM/GR   29   .081   .056 
IRAN 
   ΔRM/GDP  34   .032   .026 
   ΔRM/GR   23   .199   .162 
IRELAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .008   .014 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .028   .060 
ISRAEL 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .086   .121 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .173   .208 
ITALY 
   ΔRM/GDP  36   .007   .003 
   ΔRM/GR   36   .040   .028 
JAMAICA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .021   .021 
JAPAN 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .009   .006 
   ΔRM/GR   34   .084   .062 
JORDAN 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .044   .043 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .225   .203 
KAZAKHSTAN 
   ΔRM/GR    5   .115   .161 
KENYA 
   ΔRM/GDP  32   .014   .014 
   ΔRM/GR   28   .061   .059 
KOREA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .014   .013 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .100   .099 
KUWAIT 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .002   .019 
   ΔRM/GR   31   .005   .044 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 
   ΔRM/GDP   3   .015   .007 
   ΔRM/GR    3   .089   .045 
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.REP 
   ΔRM/GDP   9   .014   .009 
LATVIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   5   .016   .012 
   ΔRM/GR    4   .048   .037 
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Appendix A (cont.): Seigniorage Across Countries 
           Obs   Mean   StDev            Obs   Mean   StDev            Obs   Mean   StDev 
LEBANON 
   ΔRM/GR    4   .406   .224 
LESOTHO 
   ΔRM/GDP  18   .019   .024 
   ΔRM/GR   17   .050   .065 
LIBYA 
   ΔRM/GDP  33   .027   .033 
LITHUANIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   5   .020   .011 
   ΔRM/GR    5   .083   .048 
LUXEMBOURG 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .003   .015 
   ΔRM/GR   21   .015   .053 
MADAGASCAR 
   ΔRM/GDP  36   .011   .013 
   ΔRM/GR   21   .112   .153 
MALAWI 
   ΔRM/GDP  33   .014   .023 
MALAYSIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .018   .020 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .063   .142 
MALDIVES 
   ΔRM/GR   20   .248   .350 
MALI 
   ΔRM/GDP  36   .013   .018 
MALTA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .059   .091 
   ΔRM/GR   36   .157   .268 
MAURITANIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  31   .006   .029 
   ΔRM/GR   12   .034   .126 
MAURITIUS 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .015   .028 
   ΔRM/GR   32   .090   .148 
MEXICO 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .022   .024 
   ΔRM/GR   27   .235   .220 
MOLDOVA 
   ΔRM/GDP   6   .077   .075 
MONGOLIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   6   .039   .022 
   ΔRM/GR    5   .197   .118 
MOROCCO 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .015   .009 
   ΔRM/GR   31   .071   .042 
MOZAMBIQUE 
   ΔRM/GDP  11   .074   .049 
MYANMAR 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .028   .048 
   ΔRM/GR   33   .332   .516 
NAMIBIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   7   .006   .005 
   ΔRM/GR    3   .016   .023 
NEPAL 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .014   .008 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .223   .149 
NETHERLANDS 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .004   .003 
   ΔRM/GR   13   .004   .006 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
   ΔRM/GR   23   .066   .178 
NEW ZEALAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .001   .008 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .006   .029 
NICARAGUA 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .058   .091 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .255   .370 
NIGER 
   ΔRM/GDP  36   .004   .010 
NIGERIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .014   .016 
   ΔRM/GR   34   .136   .168 
NORWAY 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .005   .005 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .020   .016 
OMAN 
   ΔRM/GDP  28   .009   .013 
   ΔRM/GR   27   .024   .033 
PAKISTAN 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .019   .010 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .126   .069 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
   ΔRM/GDP  20   .005   .024 
   ΔRM/GR   20   .028   .126 
PARAGUAY 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .018   .010 
   ΔRM/GR   34   .177   .094 
PERU 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .034   .029 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .282   .300 
PHILIPPINES 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .010   .007 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .074   .054 
POLAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  18   .050   .059 
   ΔRM/GR    9   .067   .088 
PORTUGAL 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .014   .021 
   ΔRM/GR   27   .075   .142 
QATAR 
   ΔRM/GDP  31   .005   .006 
ROMANIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  19   .031   .035 
   ΔRM/GR   23   .076   .084 
RUSSIA 
   ΔRM/GR    4   .185   .077 
RWANDA 
   ΔRM/GDP  34   .006   .008 
   ΔRM/GR   20   .124   .120 
SAUDI ARABIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .009   .015 
SENEGAL 
   ΔRM/GDP  36   .005   .014 
SEYCHELLES 
   ΔRM/GDP  27   .014   .037 
   ΔRM/GR   21   .040   .098 
SIERRA LEONE 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .023   .026 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .268   .362 
SINGAPORE 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .016   .012 
   ΔRM/GR   35   .066   .057 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
   ΔRM/GDP   5   .020   .022 
SLOVENIA 
   ΔRM/GDP   5   .010   .003 
   ΔRM/GR    6   .023   .007 
SOUTH AFRICA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .007   .015 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .027   .022 
SPAIN 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .011   .004 
   ΔRM/GR   37   .078   .040 
SRI LANKA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .012   .009 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .063   .051 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
   ΔRM/GDP  18   .016   .036 
   ΔRM/GR   10   .057   .051 
ST. LUCIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  22   .012   .014 
ST. VINCENT & GRENS. 
   ΔRM/GDP  22   .015   .034 
   ΔRM/GR   20   .049   .121 
SUDAN 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .035   .031 
SURINAME 
   ΔRM/GDP  31   .069   .074 
SWAZILAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  23   .016   .027 
   ΔRM/GR   24   .057   .105 
SWEDEN 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .005   .011 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .015   .034 
SWITZERLAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .009   .015 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .110   .172 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 
   ΔRM/GDP  34   .050   .039 
   ΔRM/GR   21   .176   .106 
TANZANIA 
   ΔRM/GR   31   .135   .083 
THAILAND 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .010   .004 
   ΔRM/GR   39   .068   .029 
TOGO 
   ΔRM/GDP  35   .011   .033 
TONGA 
   ΔRM/GDP  12   .012   .074 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
   ΔRM/GDP  38   .008   .016 
   ΔRM/GR   30   .023   .054 
TUNISIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .010   .008 
   ΔRM/GR   25   .041   .026 
TURKEY 
   ΔRM/GDP  12   .031   .006 
   ΔRM/GR   29   .179   .052 
UGANDA 
   ΔRM/GDP  24   .018   .013 
   ΔRM/GR   22   .367   .395 
UKRAINE 
   ΔRM/GDP   5   .074   .072 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
   ΔRM/GDP  23   .009   .013 
   ΔRM/GR   16  4.215  8.255 
UNITED KINGDOM 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .004   .005 
   ΔRM/GR   36   .013   .015 
UNITED STATES 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .003   .001 
   ΔRM/GR   36   .021   .009 
URUGUAY 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .049   .029 
   ΔRM/GR   33   .267   .175 
VANUATU 
   ΔRM/GDP  14   .012   .017 
VENEZUELA 
   ΔRM/GDP  39   .015   .016 
   ΔRM/GR   38   .066   .071 
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF 
   ΔRM/GDP   7   .050   .048 
   ΔRM/GR    8   .261   .298 
ZAMBIA 
   ΔRM/GDP  30   .019   .022 
   ΔRM/GR   29   .087   .105 
ZIMBABWE 
   ΔRM/GDP  21   .010   .007 
   ΔRM/GR   18   .042   .026 
 
 
RM: Reserve Money (IMF-IFS-14a) 
GDP: Nominal GDP (IMF-IFS-99b) 
GR: Government Revenues (IMF- 
    IFS-81) 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables                 Obs.    Mean  Std.Dev.   Min.     Max.    Source 
Dependent: 
Δ Reserve Money (% Government Revenues) 
                          3172    14.41   71.18  -380.78  3108.74   IFS-IFM 
Δ Reserve Money (%GDP)    4376     1.87    3.62   -29.40    65.53   IFS-IFM 
 
Explanatory: 
Agriculture (% GDP)       4255    22.52   16.45     0.13    78.01   WDI-WB 
Cabinet Changes           5667      .44     .60     0        5      CNTS 
Change in Terms of Trade  3978   220801  1.5e+7   -6.3e+7  9.8e+8   WDI-WB 
Civil/ethnic conflicts in border states 
                          4957      .87    1.14     0        6      SFTF 
Creditworthiness          1988    48.13   25.00     2.01   100    Euromoney 
Deposit Money Bank Assets / Central Bank Assets  
                          4973     0.78    0.22    -0.11     1.34   BDKL 
Domestic Debt (%GDP)      1163   200.57 2588.54     0.12 52345.17   IFS-IMF 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index  4869      .58     .28     0        1      SFTF 
Exchange Rate Regime      3345     4.06    1.28     1        5      LYS 
Executive Changes         5701      .19     .46     0        4      CNTS 
Gini Coefficient           693    37.49   10.64    16.63    74.33   DK 
Govern. Revenues (%GDP)   2561    19.51    9.64     0       50.57   WDI-WB 
Government Crises         5572      .17     .52     0        7      CNTS 
Growth of Real GDP        4725     3.73    7.44   -84.12   181.14   WDI-WB 
Growth of Real GDPpc      4982     2.03    6.72   -41.91    77.69   PWT-6.1 
Index of Economic Freedom 2958     5.52    1.10     2.75     8.99   GL 
Inflation (Annual Rate)   4820    40.90  455.16   -36.74 23773.1    IFS-IFM 
Liquid Liabilities (%GDP) 3572     0.39    0.28     0        2.22   BDKL 
Polity Scale              5344      .08    7.62   -10       10    Polity IV 
Real GDP per capita       5075  5936.76 6111.80   281.25 44008.5    PWT-6.1 
Religious Homogen. Index  4670      .67     .26     0        1      SFTF 
Revolutionary war         5431      .09     .29     0        1      SFTF 
Trade (%GDP)              4815    70.06   46.37     0      439.59   WDI-WB 
Turnover Rate Governors   1990      .24     .20     0        1.08   CWN 
Upheaval                  6000     5.63   11.88     0       61.5    SFTF 
Urban population (%total) 6688    43.90   24.25     1.75   100      WDI-WB 
Notes:  
IFS-IMF: International Financial Statistics - International Monetary Fund; 
WDI-WB: World Development Indicators – World Bank;  
CNTS: Cross-National Time Series database;  
BDKL: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000); 
SFTF – State Failure Task Force database;  
LYS: Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003);  
DK: Dollar and Kraay (2002);  
PWT-6.1: Penn World Tables (Mark 6.1);  
GL: Gwartney and Lawson (2002);  
CWN: based on Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). 
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Appendix C: Interactions of Cabinet Changes 
Seigniorage 1 2 3 4 5 6 
[Cabinet changes *  
(Inflation ≥ 50%)] (-1) 
31.560 
(2.95)*** 
     
[Cabinet changes *  
(Inflation < 50%)] (-1) 
1.096 
(1.08) 
     
[Cabinet changes * (Dev. 
Countries)] (-1) 
 6.270 
(3.12)*** 
    
[Cabinet changes * (Ind. 
Countries)] (-1) 
 -.478 
(-.98) 
    
[Cabinet changes *  
(Gini > 40)] (-1) 
  5.753 
(2.60)*** 
   
[Cabinet changes *  
(Gini ≤ 40)] (-1) 
  -.117 
(-.22) 
   
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Ethnic Homogeneity)] (-1) 
   12.714 
(2.24)** 
  
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Ethnic Homogeneity)] (-1) 
   2.423 
(2.06)** 
  
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Religious Homog.)] (-1) 
    8.940 
(1.78)* 
 
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Religious Homog.)] (-1) 
    3.203 
(2.34)** 
 
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Upheaval)] (-1) 
     7.610 
(2.14)** 
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Upheaval)] (-1) 
     2.685 
(2.86)*** 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index -23.214 
(-2.59)*** 
-24.193 
(-2.64)*** 
-25.843 
(-2.90)*** 
-19.759 
(-2.01)** 
-22.867 
(-2.44)** 
-24.289 
(-2.69)*** 
Polity Scale .336 
(1.64) 
.295 
(1.43) 
.120 
(.70) 
.261 
(1.28) 
.305 
(1.46) 
.322 
(1.57) 
Urban population (% of total) -.546 
(-2.44)*** 
-.482 
(-2.38)** 
-.093 
(-.87) 
-.460 
(-2.36)** 
-.497 
(-2.39)** 
-.460 
(-2.30)** 
Real GDP per capita -.001 
(-4.48)*** 
-.002 
(-5.32)*** 
-.001 
(-5.75)*** 
-.002 
(-5.31)*** 
-.002 
(-5.03)*** 
-.002 
(-5.19)*** 
Growth of Real GDP (-1) -.521 
(-3.09)*** 
-.640 
(-3.73)*** 
-.421 
(-3.47)*** 
-.644 
(-3.80)*** 
-.660 
(-3.72)*** 
-.647 
(-3.78)*** 
42 42# Observations 2247 2306 2250 2306 2284 2306 
# Countries 107 108 105 108 107 108 
Adjusted R2 .25 .22 .33 .22 .22 .22 
Notes: - Panel regressions controlling for country fixed effects; 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a 
percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81); 
- Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated 
coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Appendix D: More Interactions of Cabinet Changes 
Seigniorage 1 2 3 4 5 6 
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Turnover)] (-1) 
4.735 
(1.95)* 
     
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Turnover)] (-1) 
-.383 
(-.55) 
     
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Econ. Freedom)] (-1) 
 15.460 
(3.53)*** 
    
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Econ. Freedom)] (-1) 
 -.274 
(-.29) 
    
[Cabinet changes * 
(Polity Scale ≤ 0)] (-1) 
  7.774 
(2.40)** 
   
[Cabinet changes * 
(Polity Scale > 0)] (-1) 
  2.166 
(1.74)* 
   
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Domestic Debt)] (-1) 
   7.766 
(1.85)* 
  
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Domestic Debt)] (-1) 
   -1.495 
(-1.43) 
  
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Creditworthiness)] (-1) 
    5.382 
(3.08)*** 
 
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Creditworthiness)] (-1) 
    -.476 
(-1.13) 
 
[Cabinet changes * (Low 
Openness] (-1) 
     4.580 
(2.86)*** 
[Cabinet changes * (High 
Openness)] (-1) 
     2.481 
(1.59) 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
Index 
-32.133 
(-3.24)*** 
-29.650 
(-2.93)*** 
-24.808 
(-2.72)*** 
-18.016 
(-2.11)** 
-25.416 
(-2.85)*** 
-24.931 
(-2.73)*** 
Polity Scale .205 
(1.05) 
.347 
(1.52) 
.487 
(2.09)** 
.294 
(1.49) 
.155 
(.88) 
.319 
(1.53) 
Urban population (% of 
total) 
-.065 
(-.32) 
-.413 
(-1.92)* 
-.471 
(-2.36)** 
-.330 
(-1.49) 
-.095 
(-.89) 
-.498 
(-2.45)** 
Real GDP per capita -.001 
(-3.35)*** 
-.002 
(-4.56)*** 
-.002 
(-5.36)*** 
-.002 
(-5.24)*** 
-.001 
(-6.03)*** 
-.002 
(-5.26)*** 
Growth of Real GDP (-1) -.348 
(-2.48)** 
-.631 
(-3.38)*** 
-.615 
(-3.71)*** 
-.574 
(-2.97)*** 
-.421 
(-3.45)*** 
-.659 
(-3.78)*** 
42# Observations 1852 2082 2063 1788 2282 2297 
# Countries 102 105 102 104 108 108 
Adjusted R2 .21 .23 .24 .16 .32 .22 
Notes: - Panel regressions controlling for country fixed effects; 
- Seigniorage, the dependent variable, was defined as the change in reserve money (IFS, line 14a) as a 
percentage of government revenues (IFS line 81); 
- Models estimated with a constant and 3 decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Their estimated 
coefficients are not shown in order to economize space; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
 
